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ABSTRACT. Protected areas are a cornerstone of biodiversity conservation, and increasingly, conservation science is integrating
ecological and social considerations in park management. Indeed, both social and ecological factors need to be considered to understand
processes that lead to changes in environmental conditions. Here, we use a social-ecological systems lens to examine changes in
governance through time in an extensive regional protected area network, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. We studied the peer-
reviewed and nonpeer-reviewed literature to develop an understanding of governance of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and its
management changes through time. In particular, we examined how interacting and changing property rights, as designated by the
evolving marine protected area network and other institutional changes (e.g., fisheries management), defined multiple goods and
ecosystem services and altered who could benefit from them. The rezoning of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 2004 substantially
altered the types and distribution of property rights and associated benefits from ecosystem goods and services. Initially, common-
pool resources were enjoyed as common and private benefits at the expense of public goods (overexploited fisheries and reduced
biodiversity and ecosystem health). The rezoning redefined the available goods and benefits and who could benefit, prioritizing public
goods and benefits (i.e., biodiversity conservation), and inducing private costs (through reduced fishing). We also found that the original
conceptualization of the step-wise progression of property rights from user to owner oversimplifies property rights based on its division
into operational and collective-choice rule-making levels. Instead, we suggest that a diversity of available management tools implemented
simultaneously can result in interactions that are seldom fully captured by the original conceptualization of the bundling of property
rights. Understanding the complexities associated with overlapping property rights and multiple goods and ecosystem services,
particularly within large-scale systems, can help elucidate the source and nature of some of the governance challenges that large protected
areas are facing.
Key Words: ecosystem services; Great Barrier Reef; marine conservation; marine protected area; property rights; social-ecological systems
INTRODUCTION
Fisheries declines and marine biodiversity loss are ongoing
environmental issues, with major repercussions for humanity and
an urgent need for solutions (Worm et al. 2006, Cardinale et al.
2012, Costello et al. 2012). Two key tools are advocated to alleviate
these problems. First, marine protected areas (MPAs) form a
cornerstone of biodiversity conservation, with implementation
increasing rapidly over the last three decades (Toropova et al.
2010, Marton-Lefèvre 2014). MPAs range in levels of protection,
often incorporating multiple types of zones, spanning from
general use zones to no-take or no-entry areas (Day et al. 2012).
While no-take areas in particular have been shown to have positive
effects on fish biomass and species richness and to contribute to
ecosystem stability (Williamson et al. 2004, Lester et al. 2009),
their effects on resource-dependent communities are less clear
(Christie et al. 2003).  
Second, improved definitions of property rights are increasingly
advocated to improve fisheries sustainability (Yandle 2006,
Allison et al. 2012, Vincent and Harris 2014). Industrial fisheries
with rights-based fisheries reforms, referred to as catch shares or
dedicated access fisheries in which fishers are allocated individual
or community rights rather than industry-wide quotas, have been
shown to be more sustainable than fisheries without such
mechanisms (Costello et al. 2008). Indeed, externalities pose a big
challenge in sustainability and could be ameliorated through
property rights (Kinzig et al. 2013). Many nongovernmental
organizations and funders are now advocating for better defining
property rights in the oceans (e.g., http://www.fishforever.org/),
making this an active area of research and implementation; the
focus has been on environmental and economic gains rather than
on evaluating broader impacts (Allison et al. 2012).  
Both of these approaches to reducing fisheries and marine
biodiversity declines recognize that marine systems are interlinked
social and ecological systems. More attention to date has focused
on studying ecological rather than social outcomes of MPAs and
rights-based fisheries approaches (e.g., improvements in density
and biomass of marine flora and fauna inside vs. outside MPAs
and in fisheries that use catch shares). Increasingly, studies are
also investigating social benefits and costs (Cinner 2007,
Pinkerton and Edwards 2009, Mascia et al. 2010, Pollnac et al.
2010), and conservation science is focusing on integrating
ecological and social aspects of MPAs in particular (Brechin et
al. 2002, Christie 2004, Ban et al. 2009, Fox et al. 2012). Because
social and ecological factors combine to create environmental
problems and solutions, both need to be considered to understand
processes that lead to changes in environmental conditions.
Concepts to assist with exploring marine social-ecological
systems (SESs), different types of governance effects, and who or
what is affected, include ecosystem services, goods, and property
rights.  
Our purpose was to use the SES framework as an overarching
tool to bring together literature on ecosystem services, goods, and
property rights to assess the effects of governance innovation and
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Fig. 1. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park before (A) and after (B) rezoning. Green, Marine National Park Zone (also called Green
Zone; these are no-take zones); light blue, General Use Zone; turquoise, Habitat Protection Zone; yellow, Conservation Park Zone;
olive, Buffer Zone; orange, Scientific Research Zone; red, Preservation Zone. Maps courtesy of the Spatial Data Centre, Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, © Commonwealth of Australia (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority) 2013.
reform on varied social and ecological outcomes in an SES. Our
case study is the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP),
Australia, which undertook a major rezoning effort (e.g., no-take
areas increased from 4.6% to 33%, Fig. 1) that was implemented
in 2004. Our case study complements another effort to examine
large cases as SESs (Cox 2014). Indeed, the need for our research
emerged from another assessment about changes in the Great
Barrier Reef SES that did not capture the nuances of changing
ecosystem services, goods, and property rights (Evans et al. 2014).
MPAs, like rights-based fisheries management, work through
changing property rights. In the GBRMP, rezoning changed
property rights by substantially altering the spatial extent of
different zones that prohibit certain uses. We are interested in the
spatial change in property rights, i.e., where different activities
can be carried out, but also discuss fisheries management changes.
We contend that integrating concepts of goods and property
rights with the interdisciplinary concept of ecosystem services
better illuminates the key processes and varied outcomes of
governance, including implementation of MPA networks and
rights-based fisheries management. We are interested in two
aspects of outcomes: how goods and ecosystem services changed,
and who benefited as a result of changing property rights. We use
the SES framework to structure our case study.
CONCEPTS: SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS,
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, TYPES OF GOODS, AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The SES framework was developed to integrate social and
ecological factors and their interactions, with a key goal to provide
a common basis for organizing and understanding SESs (Ostrom
2007, 2009). The framework divides SESs into four core
subsystems: resource system, resource units, governance system,
and actors, all of which are embedded within a larger ecological,
social, and political setting (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). This
framework allows researchers to compare cases in a systematic
manner by identifying key components of SESs (Cox 2014, Leslie
et al. 2015). For example, Basurto and Ostrom (2009)
demonstrated the use of the framework to evaluate the conditions
under which small-scale fisheries in the northern part of the Gulf
of California, Mexico, could engage in effective resource
governance and avoid tragedies of the commons. The SES
framework thus provides a useful guide for investigating
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Table 1. Definitions of key components of property rights components, ecosystem services, and goods, with examples. Based on
McGinnis (2011) for property rights, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) for ecosystem services, and Ostrom and Ostrom (1977)
for goods.
 
Concept Component Definition Example Source
Prope­
rty
rights
Access Right to enter a defined area and enjoy its
benefits without removing any resources
Tourists snorkeling or diving on a coral reef
after paying an access fee
Dixon et al. (1993),
Barr and Mourato
(2009)
Withdrawal Right to obtain specified products from a
resource system and remove that product
from the area for proscribed uses
Fishers catching a resource for which they
have authorization to do so
Cinti et al. (2010)
Management Right to participate in decisions to regulate a
resource or make improvements in
infrastructure
Fishers deciding how to distribute fishing
spots among themselves
Berkes (1986)
Exclusion Right to participate in the determination of
who has right of access, withdrawal or
management
Governing body determining who can
participate in rule-making or who can
access fishing grounds
Basurto (2005),
Gelcich et al. (2010)
Alienation Right to sell, lease, bequeath, or otherwise
transfer any of the preceding component
rights
Fishers transferring some or all of their
withdrawal rights to other individuals
Eythórsson (2000),
Carothers and
Chambers (2012)
Ecosy­
stem
services
Provisioning services Products obtained from ecosystems Commercial and recreational fisheries catch
fish for consumption
Deloitte Access
Economics (2013)
Cultural services Nonmaterial benefits people get from
ecosystems through enjoyment, spiritual
enrichment, recreation, etc.
Tourism, commercial and recreational
fishing, and research are examples and
contributed AU $6.9 billion in 2006–2007
and AU $5.7 billion in 2011–2012 to the
Australian economy
Deloitte Access
Economics (2013),
http://www.gbrmpa.
gov.au/zoning-
permits-and-plans/
environmental-
management-charge
Regulating services Benefits obtained from regulation of
ecosystem processes
Key regulating services provided by the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park include
protection from storms and tsunamis, water
purification, climate regulation, and carbon
sequestration
Stoeckl et al. (2011)
Supporting services Services necessary for the production of
other ecosystem services
Key supporting services include nutrient
cycling, habitat provision, coastal
protection, and ecosystem resilience
Stoeckl et al. (2011)
Goods Public goods A tangible commodity or product that can be
accessed and enjoyed by everyone without
subtracting from the enjoyment of others
Clean water, biodiversity Stoeckl et al. (2011)
Private goods A tangible commodity or product that is
consumed by one or a few individuals and
hence is not available to others
Boats, fuel, fishing gear, harvested seafood,
individual transferable (tradeable) quota
Toll goods A tangible commodity or product for which
access is restricted, yet use by one does not
subtract from the enjoyment of others
Tourist charter boats, ecological research http://www.gbrmpa.
gov.au
Common-pool
resources
A tangible commodity or product that can be
relatively easily accessed but once harvested
or consumed is not available to others
Numerous fisheries Ostrom (1990)
environmental issues and solutions for which both social and
ecological characteristics matter. We used the SES framework to
identify key components (resources, actor groups, governance
system) that matter at the scale of our case and examined how
these components were affected by the rezoning.  
To complement the SES framework, we employed
interdisciplinary concepts of ecosystem goods and services for
our analysis. Ecosystem services refer to the benefits that people
derive from nature. Ecosystem services are commonly categorized
into provisioning, cultural, regulating, and supporting services
(see Table 1 for definitions; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
2005). Different ecosystem services behave like specific types of
goods, i.e., public, private, common-pool resources, or toll goods,
depending on the service, its purpose of use, and the property
rights assigned to it, all of which determine levels of exclusivity
and subtractability (Table 1, Fig. 2; Ostrom and Ostrom 1977).
We refer to goods in the economic sense as tangible commodities
such as products, materials, or services. Exclusivity occurs when
users can be denied goods unless they meet the conditions of the
supplier or owner (i.e., they can easily be denied access to goods).
Subtractability implies that a good used by one cannot be used
by others (Ostrom and Ostrom 1977). Importantly, goods are not
synonymous with property rights but can be governed using
different rights arrangements.
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Fig. 2. Examples of activities and ecosystem services derived
from different types of goods and ecosystem services in the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. Black text, types of goods;
purple text, ecosystem services; orange text, examples. Types of
goods are delineated into four categories here but should be
viewed as a continuum.
Property rights are a key management tool used to assign benefits
from ecosystems to people (Table 1). Although the details of
property rights vary from place to place with beliefs, conventions,
and legal and institutional context (Baland and Platteau 1996,
McCay 1996, 2002), the components of these rights appear to be
consistent and stable (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). In marine
systems, relevant components of property rights include rights of
access (ability to visit an area), withdrawal (take specific
products), management or comanagement (participate in
decisions about management), exclusion (determine who is
excluded from a right of access, withdrawal, or management), and
alienation (sell, lease, or transfer rights; see Table 1 for full
definitions and examples; Ostrom 2003, McGinnis 2011). Past
research on property rights finds that such rights occur as bundles
and argues that they often come as hierarchical bundles where,
for example, those with management rights will also have access
and withdrawal rights (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). From this
perspective, the packaging of property rights advances in a simple
step-progression from authorized user (right to access/withdraw
resources) to claimant (adding management privileges/
responsibilities) to proprietor (adding the right of exclusion) and
finally to owner (with the right of alienation). In addition, these
bundles also depend on the nature of the rule-making process
within which they occur: who implements the rules (operational
level) and who has the authority to change or create rules
(collective-choice level). In this context, the rights of access and
withdrawal are at the operational level, whereas management,
exclusion, and alienation are at the collective-choice level.  
Since the mid-1980s, natural resource management has focused
primarily on understanding how property rights and other
institutions can govern common-pool resources. However, MPAs,
as a particular arrangement of property rights, can deliver a range
of different types of goods and thus can affect diverse ecosystem
services. By merging these three distinct theoretical concepts, we
can better understand how property rights that are influenced by
MPA zoning specifically mediate the benefits that different
stakeholders can gain from ecosystem services (Daw et al. 2011).
METHODS
Case study background
The Great Barrier Reef of Australia is a globally important
marine ecosystem with vast environmental, cultural, social, and
economic value. Human impacts on the Great Barrier Reef have
occurred since the late 1800s through agricultural expansion and
the introduction of mining (McCulloch et al. 2003). Concern
about effects on the reef in the 1960s and 1970s culminated in the
Great Barrier Reef Act in 1975. In recognition of the need for
improved protection for biodiversity, the GBRMP was rezoned
in 2004. The rezoning substantially changed the key management
tool, the zoning plan (which has seven zones), considerably
increasing no-take areas from 4.6 to 33% to improve biodiversity
conservation (Fig. 1). The GBRMP covers approximately 345,000
km² and includes: islands (1%); coral reefs (7%); seagrass, shoals,
and sandy or muddy seabed (61%); continental slope (15%); and
deep ocean (16%; GBRMPA 2009). We selected the GBRMP for
our analysis because it is a large SES that provides multiple
ecosystem services and underwent significant changes to its
governance system, and the accompanying set of property rights,
between 2004 and 2014. There is a wealth of secondary data on
the GBRMP, and yet relatively few analyses of these data are
informed by institutional or governance theory. Finally, the
GBRMP is often given as an example of successful marine
conservation but provides an interesting case of the use of
property rights to achieve a broad suite of governance goals
(Fernandes et al. 2005, McCook et al. 2010, Day and Dobbs 2013).
Data collection and analysis
We take a longitudinal, qualitative, case study approach (Yin
1984) to examine in-depth the multiple processes of governance
transition, in particular rezoning in the GBRMP. We used the
SES framework to structure the analysis by identifying key
components (resources, actor groups, governance system) that
matter at the scale of our case for investigating shifts in property
rights, goods, and ecosystem services in the GBRMP (Fig. 3). Our
analysis applies the theoretical concepts described previously to
a detailed examination of change processes in the Great Barrier
Reef established from the peer-reviewed and nonpeer-reviewed
literature and our personal knowledge of the Great Barrier Reef
SES. Using the SES framework and the integrated concepts
described, our analysis pieces together a somewhat disjointed set
of literature on change processes and outcomes in the Great
Barrier Reef, for instance, bringing together the social and
ecological, commercial and recreational, and conservation and
fisheries management literature. Our analysis is somewhat limited
by our reliance on available secondary data. However, we believe
that despite these limitations, the ability to conduct a systematic
analysis over a relatively long temporal scale (~30 yr) provides a
unique opportunity to assess how goods and ecosystem services
changed, and who benefited as a result of changing property
rights within the SES.  
Following the terminology of the SES framework, we identified
the key components comprising the GBRMP as a SES (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3. Key components of the social-ecological system framework included in this study. Based on McGinnis (2011), Basurto
(2013), and McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).
We focused on the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act as the
governance system. We defined key actor groups as those having
an effect at the scale of the GBRMP. These actors include
managers of the area (reef managers and fisheries managers) and
three types of users (commercial fishers, recreational fishers, and
tourists). Our analysis focused on these key actor groups, as well
as gear-type subgroups for commercial fisheries, because they
have strong effects on the broad GBRMP system, i.e., all
ecosystems contained within the park, including coral reefs,
mangroves, sandy bottom, etc. (hereafter referred to as Reef).
However, we recognize that there are other actors within this SES
who interact in different ways with one another or with the system
(e.g., farmers and other land owners in the region, environmental
activists, shipping industry) and whom we did not include because
of the paucity of data in regard to our research question.
Governance outcomes in the GBRMP have typically been
understood in terms of changes to resource units such as coral
cover and target fish populations (GBRMPA 2009, 2014). In a
previous analysis, we used these variables as proxies for ecosystem
health and fisheries sustainability, respectively (Evans et al. 2014).
For the purposes of this analysis, however, the interaction
outcome variables we are interested in are: type of rights, and
degree of access the rights convey to ecosystem goods and services
for different actor groups. We concentrate our results on these
indicative social outcomes, but, following the SES approach, we
discuss them in a system-level understanding of environmental
outcomes.  
We synthesized key events in the management of the GBRMP
over a 40-yr period by reviewing relevant policies, legislation, and
management plans (e.g., acts, zoning plans, management plans),
and the peer-reviewed and nonpeer-reviewed literature. We
developed a timeline of key events in the history of the GBRMP.
For each key event, we deduced how property rights changed with
management changes for key components of the SES, the effect
these changes had on goods and ecosystem services, and who
benefited. We subdivided the timeline into three periods based
around major changes in the governance regime and categorized
key characteristics of (and changes to) the ecosystem services and
property rights systems. Furthermore, for each period, we
evaluated the extent of spatial changes in management (i.e.,
zoning). In particular, we examined the property rights associated
with each of the seven types of zones, and the corresponding
goods and ecosystem services. We assessed whether the key actor
groups’ property rights changed between the initial zoning plan
and the rezoned system. We did this by calculating the percent
change in each zoning area pre- and post-rezoning.
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Table 2. Major management changes through time for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, and resulting property rights changes: park
establishment, 1975 to 1999.
 
Date Management event or
change
Resulting change in property rights Types of goods and ecosystem services
affected
SES component
changed or
affected†
Pre-­
1975
Traditional fisheries
management
N/A N/A N/A
1975 Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park Act 
passed
Management, exclusion, and some alienation
rights designated to the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park Authority; all access and extraction
rights for mining removed
Provisioning: mining ban within park
boundaries prohibits extraction of all
mineral resources as private goods;
Cultural: establishment of a permitting
system for tourism operators that provide
snorkelling and diving activities as toll
goods
G → A
M
 → A
U
 → 
R
1979 Comanagement
agreement signed
between federal and
state governments
Management rights designated to the state
government
N/A A
M
 ↔ A
M
1981–
1988
Initial zoning
implemented
Access rights for all actors except permitted
scientists removed in no-entry zones; extraction
rights for fishers removed in no-take zones
Provisioning: most other property rights
changes apply to fisheries and other
marine resources as common-pool
resources;
Supporting: biodiversity protection
through the implementation of no-take
zones as a public good
A
M
 → A
U
 → R
1981 Great Barrier Reef
World Heritage Area
established
UNESCO World Heritage Committee does not
have authority to alter property rights but world
heritage status can be retracted, thereby
incentivising protection of the region’s valued
ecological and cultural features
Cultural: Adds value to the public and toll
goods of the Great Barrier Reef by
attracting national and international
tourists
N/A
1992–
1993
Aboriginal native title
recognized
Some access and extraction rights re-established
for indigenous groups on land
N/A N/A
1994 Fisheries Act passed Designated management rights in multiuse zones
to the Queensland Fisheries Department
N/A G → A
M
 → A
U
 → 
R
†SES = social-ecological system, G = governance system, A
U
 = actor user group, A
M
 = actor manager, R = resource.
RESULTS
Summary of management changes
The GBRMP is managed for multiple values. Core strategic goals
and principles include: a diverse, resilient environment;
sustainable use; enhancement of “values”; integrated
management; knowledge-based, precautionary management;
and an informed, involved, and committed community
(GBRMPA 1994). Activities within the GBRMP are managed
through spatial allocation (zoning; Fig. 1) and temporal measures
(e.g., seasonal closures) of various types of property rights
systems (Fig. 2). Some activities are prohibited everywhere in the
GBRMP (mining and oil drilling), whereas others are permitted
in clearly defined areas (fishing, tourism, and shipping) and
during specific times of the year (GBRMPA 2009); many of these
have been changed during the course of almost 40 years of
management.  
Our review of management changes in the GBRMP revealed
many adjustments through time that affected property rights,
types of goods, and ecosystem services. We divided management
of the GBRMP into three phases: initial zoning (1975–1999; Table
2), transition period (1999–2003; Table 3), and rezoned system
(2004–current; Table 4). Here, we provide a much-abbreviated
summary. Spatial management of the Reef began with the
creation of the marine park in 1975 and its governing authority,
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA). The
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act prohibited mining
throughout the region, enabled zoning to differentiate access and
use rights for the park, and assigned management, exclusion, and
alienation rights to the GBRMPA, authorizing it to design a
system of other permissions to regulate, enforce, sanction, and
monitor activities, including harvesting, shipping, and research.
The initial zoning plan was prepared and gazetted in 1981 and
implemented incrementally (Day 2002). The transition period
occurred from 1999 to 2003–2004, when a systematic conservation
planning approach called the Representative Areas Programme
was undertaken. The program aimed to identify and implement
a larger network of no-take zones that represented the diversity
of bioregions and habitats encompassed in the GBRMP. The
rezoned system saw the implementation of the new zoning plan
in 2004. The plan designated seven marine zones ranging from
“most reasonable use” to no-entry areas reserved for research
purposes only. With the exception of the no-entry and no-take
zones, access to other areas of the multiuse park are “as of right”
or by permit (Macintosh et al. 2010).  
Changes in management in the GBRMP affected several kinds
of social-ecological interactions. Overarching interactions
involve the introduction or significant amendment of the
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Table 3. Major management changes through time for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, and resulting property rights changes:
transition period, 1999–2003.
 
Date Management event or
change
Resulting change in property rights Types of goods and ecosystem services
affected
SES component
changed or
affected†
1999 Representative Areas
Programme commences
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority exercise
their management right to rezone park
N/A A
M
 → A
U
 → R
2000 Queensland East Coast
Trawl Fisheries
Management Plan
implemented
Plan followed a significant reduction in effort quota
and licenses allocated to the fishery; while overall
withdrawal rights were reduced, remaining operators
could buy a larger share of remaining withdrawal
rights, which they also have the right to lease or sell to
other operators (alienation rights)
Provisioning: reduced pressure on
common-pool resources;
Supporting: possible benefits for
global biodiversity through sustainable
fisheries and reduced habitat impacts
A
M
 → A
U
 → R
2001 Croker Decision
extending Indigenous
Australian’s rights to
Sea Country
Some access and extraction rights re-established for
indigenous groups in sea-country
Provisioning: greater rights over
marine common-pool resources for
indigenous subsistence purposes
G → A
U
 → R
†SES = social-ecological system, G = governance system, A
U
 = actor user group, A
M
 = actor manager, R = resource.
governance system (Governance [G] → Managers [AM] → Users
[AU] → Resources [R]; Tables 2, 3, and 4), for example, when the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act (1975) and Fisheries Act (1994)
were passed. For instance, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 
prohibited all seabed mining, thus directly affecting the acquisition
of private goods by a specific user group. In another instance
(Croker Decision 2001), a change to the governance system directly
influenced users and thereby affected the resource system (G → 
AU → R). This decision resulted in collective-choice rights for
indigenous groups who now comanage their common-pool
resources. More often, collective-choice rights remained with
managers who made decisions to change operational institutions
within the existing governance frame, leading to changes in the
property rights of users and in turn affecting the resource (AM → 
AU → R). This type of interaction occurred when the initial zoning
was implemented (1981–1988), during the Representative Areas
Programme (1999–2003), and in changes to fisheries management
plans (e.g., DEEDI 2009). In these cases, management agencies
restricted the property rights of users for the extraction of
common-pool resources within the park. Finally, one interaction
created a link between two management agencies (comanagement
agreement in 1979; AM ↔ AM).
Changes in goods, ecosystem services, and property rights
Management changes since the implementation of the GBRMP
signal a general trend of reduced provisioning services in an
attempt to increase cultural, regulating, and provisioning services
(i.e., reducing fishing to allow depleted species to recover and be
fished again; Tables 2, 3, and 4). The GBRMP was initially
established to prevent mining within the park boundaries (Table
2). With continued evidence of declining ecosystem health,
including regulating and supporting services (Stoeckl et al. 2011),
subsequent management changes reduced the extent and intensity
of provisioning services (i.e., commercial and recreational fishing).
Of the users, commercial fishers carried the highest cost and
recreational fishers some cost, whereas tourists benefited. In
particular, the rezoning effort reduced the area available for fishing,
and revised management plans in commercial fisheries (e.g., Coral
Reef Finfish Fishery, East Coast Inshore Finfish Fishery, and East
Coast Trawl Fisheries) restricted withdrawal rights (Table 4). These
changes were supported by structural adjustment schemes to buy
back fishing rights and reduce fishing capacity in the region
overall (Gunn et al. 2010). Hence, fishing effort linked to
provisioning services was not simply displaced in this case  
Compared to ecosystem services, changes in types of goods have
been more complicated (see Fig. 2 for review of types of goods).
Most of the changes that reduced the spatial extent and intensity
of fishing shifted fish from being a common-pool resource to
serving as a public good. This shift is due to removing withdrawal
rights for fish in some places (i.e., no-take zones), thus changing
the role of fish from a catchable resource to emphasizing fishes’
role in rebuilding fish stocks and contributing to reef health. At
the same time, some commercial fisheries management changes
redefined fish as private property, rather than as common-pool
resources, through implementation of individual transferable
quotas (ITQs). The use of ITQs created property rights that made
fish an excludable good. Management actions also created toll
goods (for tourism operators) for what was previously a public
good by creating exclusive rights for licensed operators to take
tourists to the Reef.  
Most of the changes to ecosystem services and goods were
implemented through shifting property rights, especially
withdrawal rights. The major shift in property rights occurred
when the GBRMP was rezoned. The rezoning effort was
instigated primarily to address concerns that the levels of
biodiversity protection for the Great Barrier Reef were
inadequate and were unlikely to ensure that the entire ecosystem
remained healthy, productive, and resilient into the future (Day
2011). Implemented in 2004, the rezoning changed the spatial
coverage of where activities could occur (Fig. 1; Olsson et al. 2008,
McCook et al. 2010). In particular, it changed the spatial coverage
of the seven types of zones. Each zone permits users to engage in
different types of activity, i.e., each zone has specified property
rights for users (Fig. 4). The general use zone allows all reasonable
use and thus permits all types of fishing (i.e., commercial trawl,
gillnet, other, and recreational fishing have withdrawal rights).
This zone covered 78% of the Reef before rezoning, which was
reduced to 34% after rezoning. The habitat protection zone allows
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Table 4. Major management changes through time for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, and resulting property rights changes:
rezoned system, 2004 to current.
 
Date Management event or
change
Resulting change in property rights Types of goods and ecosystem services
affected
SES component
changed or
affected†
2004 Queensland Coral Reef
FinFish Fishery
Management Plan
implemented
Plan introduced common and private property
rights through total allowable commercial catch
(TACC) and individual transferable quotas (ITQ)
for the commercial sector; these rules restricted
withdrawal rights but allowed commercial
operators to exercise greater exclusion and
alienation rights over their fishery resource;
introduced new size and bag limits, or restricted
withdrawal rights, for charter, recreational, and
commercial sectors
Provisioning: reduced pressure on
common-pool resources; shift from
common-pool resources to private
goods;
Supporting: possible benefits for
global biodiversity through
sustainable fisheries
A
M
 → A
U
 → R
2004 New Zoning Plan for the
Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park passed and
implemented; Structural
Adjustment Package
agreed
Multiple changes to access, withdrawal,
management, exclusion, and alienation rights (see
Table 2)
Shifted emphasis from provisioning
services (fisheries) to supporting,
regulating, and cultural services
A
M
 → A
U
 → R
2007 Amendment to the Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park
Act of  1975
Legislated for a lock-down on zoning plans and
thus changes to access and withdrawal rights for a
minimum of 7 yr from date of establishment under
the premise of providing stability to businesses,
communities, and biological systems
Supporting: consistent protection of
global biodiversity, allowing time for
renewal of this public good where
previously degraded due to fishing
N/A
2009 Queensland East Coast
Inshore Finfish Fishery
Management Plan
Plan reduced withdrawal rights by legislating more
stringent controls on harvesting of sharks and grey
mackerel through a TACC allowance, new size and
bag limits, and annual seasonal closures for
barramundi and spawning tailor
Provisioning: reduced pressure on
common-pool resources;
Supporting: possible benefits for
global biodiversity through
sustainable fisheries
A
M
 → A
U
 → R
2010 Queensland East Coast
Trawl Fisheries
Management Plan
updated
Update tightened licensing and gear regulations for
the fishery in consultation with trawl fishers
Provisioning: reduction in pressure on
common-pool marine resources and
possible benefits;
Supporting: possible benefits for
biodiversity protection through
reduced habitat alterations
A
M
 → A
U
 → R
2011 UNESCO report on
Great Barrier Reef World
Heritage Area
Noted increasing threat from coastal development
along Queensland coast
N/A N/A
†SES = social-ecological system, G = governance system, A
U
 = actor user group, A
M
 = actor manager, R = resource.
some extractive uses, but prohibits trawling. The conservation
park zone allows some more-limited extractive uses, and the buffer
zone is a bit more restrictive. The scientific research zone allows
no extractive use except some scientific sampling. The marine
national park zones, also known as the Green Zone, allows no
extractive activities, but access rights remain (i.e., fishing boats
can transit over the area as long as they do not engage in fishing).
Finally, the preservation zone is the most restrictive, also
prohibiting access. The rezoning effort thus changed the access,
withdrawal, and exclusion rights of actors (Fig. 4). The extent of
the GBRMP protected by no-take zones (i.e., areas without
consumptive withdrawal rights) increased from 4.6 to 33%
(115,000 km²; Figs. 1 and 4).  
Unlike withdrawal rights, management rights (Table 1, Fig. 4),
which enable actors to participate in decisions about regulating
the resources (Ostrom 2003), did not change for users as a result
of rezoning; they only changed for managers. In the GBRMP,
management is formally shared between the federal and state
governments, and between reef and fisheries managers. Rezoning
changed the focus of management rights allocated to managers
of the region (GBRMPA, Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service,
and Fisheries Queensland) from fisheries management (delivering
common-pool resources as a provisioning service) toward
biodiversity conservation (creating a public good and supporting
services), with more monitoring and enforcement of no-take
zones and the public goods derived from them. Other actor groups
only have an informal say in management; they can make
suggestions but do not have the authority to make management
changes. Tourism operators and fishers can voluntarily contribute
to management activities, for example, by monitoring and
reporting coral bleaching, removing crown-of-thorns-starfish (a
hyperabundant species), tracking their carbon accounts, or
reporting illegal fishing. Resource users do not hold management
or exclusion rights per se in that they cannot decide to what extent
they and others are regulated or for what purposes (Fig. 4). There
are, however, informal mechanisms of comanagement between
government and other actors (e.g., see roles of partners listed by
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Fig. 4. Property rights by Great Barrier Reef Marine Park zone,
with zones ordered from least restrictive to most restrictive. (A)
General use zone: allows reasonable use, including extraction.
(B) Habitat protection zone: allows some extractive use. (C)
Conservation park zone: allows some extractive use. (D) Buffer
zone: limited extractive use. (E) Scientific research: no
extractive use except some scientific sampling. (F) Marine
national park zones: no extractive use. A checkmark indicates
the presence of a particular property right for an actor group in
a zone. Percentages indicate the percent area in each zone pre-
and post-rezoning. The preservation zone is not shown because
none of the property rights apply (pre-rezoning area: 0.1%;
post-rezoning area: 0.2%). Property rights did not change
within zones, but the proportion allocated to different zones
changed with rezoning. Withdrawal rights for fisheries are
consumptive, whereas for tourism are nonconsumptive.
Alienation rights for commercial fisheries are only related to
being able to sell individual transferable quotas.
GBRMPA: http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/our-partners). These
mechanisms include stakeholder consultation during rezoning
(the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act lays out the minimum
public participation required in the preparation of a zoning plan),
committees to review and update management plans and policy
(e.g., Australian Government 2010), Indigenous Reef Advisory
Committee and other Reef Advisory Committees, 11 Local
Marine Advisory Committees, and the Reef Guardian Fishers,
Fig. 5. Changes in property rights (% area) in the Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park due to rezoning in 2004 by activity. Changes
< 1% are not visible in the figure. Access rights declined by
0.1% for all activities. Withdrawal rights (nonconsumptive)
declined by 0.1% for commercial and casual tourism.
Management and exclusion rights did not change.
Farmers, and Councils programs. Although these diverse
stakeholders and the public are consulted during development of
zoning plans and other policy changes, they do not have formal
management rights.
Trade-offs and changing beneficiaries
In the GBRMP, a number of trade-offs were involved when
changes to management were made: trade-offs between ecosystem
services and between beneficiaries of ecosystem services, often
linked to types of goods and implemented through shifting
property rights. Rezoning shifted the emphasis from provisioning
services (fisheries) to other services (supporting, regulating,
cultural). The beneficiaries of ecosystem services thus shifted as
well, from those that previously relied on private and common-
pool resource goods and benefited from provisioning services
(fishers, traders and consumers of local fish) toward those that
benefit from toll and public goods, and cultural, regulating, and
supporting services. The cost of rezoning, measured as the area
of property rights lost (Fig. 5), thus fell mainly onto extractive
actors at a local scale, whereas the benefits accrued to those who
use toll and public goods, and cultural, regulating, and supporting
ecosystem services. For example, the reduction in fishable area
(withdrawal rights) was 44.1% for commercial trawl fisheries,
31.1% for gillnet fisheries, and 27.4% for other fisheries (Fig. 5).
Alienation rights were likewise calculated as the area that
remained fishable for fisheries that are managed under tradeable
quotas (i.e., fisheries that can sell, or alienate, their withdrawal
rights). In contrast, there was no change in management and
exclusion rights for either of the groups (Fig. 5). Benefits of
protection extend beyond the local scale; thus, people who benefit
from public goods and cultural, regulating, and supporting
services are more widely distributed. The beneficiaries of toll
goods are more local and incur some costs for the privilege (e.g.,
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the cost of hiring a charter boat), although this does not
compensate the extractive actors directly. For the most part, those
benefiting from the Reef’s public goods and ecosystem services
other than provisioning services do not currently incur costs, or
at least costs proportional to the benefits they receive. There is
an environmental management charge for tourists visiting the
reef through commercial tourism operators, but there are no
other mechanisms for payments for ecosystem services currently
in place for the Reef.
DISCUSSION
The major gap our work addresses is how changing property
rights, resulting primarily from MPA implementation, affects the
social-ecological outcomes (goods and ecosystem services) for
different actors. A vast literature exists on MPAs, and a separate
literature provides theoretical insights on property rights
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992, Fennell 2011, Marschke et al. 2012),
with as yet little connection between them (but see Mascia and
Claus 2009). The link between MPAs and property rights is of
particular interest to fisheries, a key use being managed within
MPAs, where changes to or strengthening of property rights are
actively being proposed (catch shares, Territorial User Rights
Fisheries, etc.). Investigating changing property rights within an
MPA, through a rezoning process, thus provides insights about
the potential effects of such changes. The expanding literature
on rights-based fisheries has not yet been appreciated for what it
also means for marine conservation policy and planning. In the
context of small-scale fisheries in developing countries, Allison
et al. (2012) argue that more secure, less vulnerable fishers make
better managers and stewards. They argue for an appreciation of
human rights within fisheries management to bolster property
rights approaches. These arguments extend to MPA
implementation, in both developing and developed countries,
where the effects of associated changes to property rights tend
to be concentrated among one set of actors. Our study brings
some of these links between rights-based fisheries outcomes and
MPA governance outcomes to the foreground, in particular, the
trade-offs between goods, services, and beneficiaries.
Furthermore, by using the SES framework, we provide an
approach for investigating how changing property rights can
affect goods and ecosystem services that can be applied in other
cases, allowing for future cross-case comparisons.  
Our in-depth investigation of changes brought about by rezoning
in the GBRMP highlight several conclusions. Management
emphasis in this MPA shifted from provisioning services, i.e.,
allowing fishing to occur in most of the MPA, to regulating and
supporting services. What were previously private benefits shifted
to public goods. This was done primarily by reducing withdrawal
rights to fisheries by expanding restrictive zones. The fishing
method that has the most severe environmental impacts, bottom
trawling (Watling and Norse 1998), also had the largest reduction
in withdrawal rights. Tourists and the tourism industry are the
main direct beneficiaries.  
Despite some ecological benefits of the rezoning effort (i.e.,
demonstrated effectiveness of no-take zones at recovering
depleted fish populations; McCook et al. 2010), the GBRMP still
faces a number of governance challenges that emerge in part from
a limited understanding of the interplay among a diverse set of
property rights, goods, and ecosystem services. For instance,
recreational fishing is still essentially treated as open access and
so continues to manifest as uncertainty in ecological and social
outcomes for Great Barrier Reef fisheries overall. Further, one
challenge with the current rezoning is that where it prohibits
consumptive withdrawal (fisheries) or nonconsumptive
withdrawal (i.e., use by tourism), it does not necessarily prohibit
access. Hence, a fishing boat may pass through a particular zone
where fishing is prohibited, and it is the responsibility of
management agencies to observe illegal activity directly to
sanction rule-breakers. Continuing to allow unspecified access
rights to zones where withdrawal rights are removed creates an
added challenge in monitoring and enforcement for reef and
fisheries managers, and may explain some of the disparity in
ecological outcomes for no-entry and no-take zones in the Great
Barrier Reef (GBRMPA 2009). Many small-scale MPAs do not
allow access to fishing vessels in no-take areas. However, in large-
scale systems, the legitimacy of removing access to no-take zones
(with implications for transport and freedom of the sea in 33%
of the park) or the practicality of endeavoring to license up to
700,000 recreational fishers is a question of political debate.
Nevertheless, the way in which property rights are currently
allocated has continuing implications for ecological outcomes in
the GBRMP.  
Our analysis of changes in management of the GBRMP provides
both theoretically and empirically relevant findings. In terms of
theoretical findings, our case study illustrates that the mixture of
property right bundles extends beyond the original classification
by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), which suggests a simple step-
progression from authorized user all the way to owner.
Furthermore, our case study also reveals that the original
distinction among property rights components based on the rule-
making authority, i.e., operational and collective-choice levels
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992), is rather rigid and cannot account
for the bundling nature of property rights in the GBRMP. In this
case, the right of alienation was bundled with access and
withdrawal rights through ITQs and other mechanisms, akin to
the authorized user privileges of the original classification. What
was surprising is that management and exclusion rights were not
affected by any of the modifications in the GBRMP governance
system and remained out of the hands of the resource user groups.
As a result, we conclude that the five-tiered step-wise progression
from user to owner oversimplifies property rights with multiple
types of rights. We argue that the original classification can be
modified based on the specific governance system in place (i.e.,
top-down management, comanagement, or community-based
management) and the type of implemented management tools
(e.g., area closures, ITQs, trip limits, gear restrictions). In
addition, we also suggest that the current management strategies
that in many instances attempt to achieve multiple goals
(biodiversity protection, resource conservation, enhancement)
can interact with each other and, because of that, are seldom
fully captured by the original classification proposed by Schlager
and Ostrom (1992). Thus, the bundling of property rights takes
on additional complexity and new opportunities and creates a
productive area for new research opportunities.  
Two aspects of our empirical findings are relevant to other
regions. First, by using a large-scale case study of an evolving
multiple-use MPA network, we demonstrated trade-offs in the
goods and services available to actors within and across spatial
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and temporal scales: from regional to global, and before and after
rezoning of the MPA. Much of the current controversy
surrounding protected areas comes, in part, from the differences
between beneficiaries: who pays and who profits. Governing for
multiple types of goods and services results in a provision of
benefits at scales, both temporal and spatial, that are different
from where costs accrue. In the temporal context, conservation
benefits can take decades to realize, whereas the costs of forfeiting
resource use are borne in the short to medium term (Russ and
Alcala 2011). However, some of the conservation benefits of the
GBR rezoning occurred surprisingly quickly; for example, in the
GBRMP, the recovery of coral trout was observed after 1.5 to 2
yr (Russ et al. 2008). In the spatial context, conservation benefits
often occur at a regional or global scale, whereas the costs collect
at a local scale. Similarly, the costs and benefits in achieving
development goals such as Reef-based employment or sustainable
livelihoods may not match up at a given level, but even then it is
not clear that costs and benefits will cancel out or that one group
at a local level will not benefit at the expense of another (Smith
et al. 2010). Thus, the lens of multiple goods, ecosystem services,
and property rights can provide an approach for examining cross-
scale linkages in SESs.  
Second, our analysis indicates the importance of external drivers
to the stability and proper functioning of SESs, even at the large
spatial scale of GBRMP. External drivers such as land-based
pollution, coastal development, climate change, and storms
cannot be readily managed by MPA managers. Part of the
problem, at least for regional threats and in MPAs affected by
land-based effects, is that the property rights associated with
goods and services on land tend to incentivize the provision of
private over public goods, i.e., crops over unpolluted run-off,
explaining some of the continued decline in coral cover across the
Great Barrier Reef (Sweatman 2008, Hughes et al. 2011,
Sweatman et al. 2011, De’ath et al. 2012). Interestingly, the threat
to the GBRMP from external drivers, in particular coastal
development, has caught the attention of the international
community. The UNESCO World Heritage Committee has no
legislative rights over the GBRMP but has threatened to list the
area as “World Heritage in danger” if  coastal development policy
is not systematically reviewed and strategically implemented
(UNESCO 2012). In effect, this committee is leveraging informal
institutions and the risk of lost revenues to the Queensland Reef-
based tourism industry through the reduced value of cultural
services and toll goods to advocate for more stringent regulation
of coastal development in the region. As with our other
contributions, we found that the lens of goods, ecosystem services,
and property rights can facilitate identification of external
influences on MPAs.  
We have built on previous approaches to integrating property
rights into protected area and resource management (Schlager
and Ostrom 1992, Mascia and Claus 2009), yet several limitations
of our study warrant acknowledgement. Our study is based on
the extensive peer-reviewed and nonpeer-reviewed literature
available on management of the GBRMP but does not include
new data collection. Additional insights could likely be drawn if
our study could have been augmented with primary data,
especially interviews with actor groups over the course of the
management changes. Furthermore, while much ecological data
exist about the effectiveness of zones in the GBRMP (McCook
et al. 2010, Harrison et al. 2012), no equivalent social monitoring
existed until recently (National Environmental Research
Program 2013). Thus, we were unable to provide quantitative
metrics about how actors groups have been affected or have
perceived the rezoning process.  
Although our case study focused on the GBRMP, similar
complexities in the interplay between goods, ecosystem services,
and property rights are likely evident in all large-scale, multiple-
use protected areas, both terrestrial and marine. The explicit
examination of these concepts and how they are applied within
protected areas serves to highlight the matches and mismatches
between social and ecological components of complex systems
and across scales. Recognizing the inherent limitations of the
provision of each type of good, and the interactions among them,
and evaluating actors’ incentives for the provision and use of
goods and ecosystem services is crucial to effective, long-term
governance of large-scale protected areas and rights-based
management.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7857
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